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The threat of bioterrorism has stimulated interest in enhancing public health surveillance to detect disease outbreaks more rap-
idly than is currently possible. To advance research on improving the timeliness of outbreak detection, the Defense Advanced
Research Project Agency sponsored the Bio-event Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology (BioALIRT) project begin-
ning in 2001. The purpose of this paper is to provide a synthesis of research on outbreak detection algorithms conducted by aca-
demic and industrial partners in the BioALIRT project. We ﬁrst suggest a practical classiﬁcation for outbreak detection algorithms
that considers the types of information encountered in surveillance analysis. We then present a synthesis of our research according to
this classiﬁcation. The research conducted for this project has examined how to use spatial and other covariate information from
disparate sources to improve the timeliness of outbreak detection. Our results suggest that use of spatial and other covariate infor-
mation can improve outbreak detection performance. We also identiﬁed, however, methodological challenges that limited our ability
to determine the beneﬁt of using outbreak detection algorithms that operate on large volumes of data. Future research must address
challenges such as forecasting expected values in high-dimensional data and generating spatial and multivariate test data sets.
Published by Elsevier Inc.
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The threat of bioterrorism has stimulated interest in
public health surveillance. Government agencies and
researchers are particularly interested in enhancing the
ability of surveillance systems to detect outbreaks rap-
idly [1]. This interest stems, in part, from the large pro-
jected savings resulting from detecting outbreaks rapidly
in some scenarios, particularly scenarios associated with1532-0464/$ - see front matter. Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.jbi.2004.11.007
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1 See the acknowledgments for a full list of contributors.bioterrorism [2]. The potential improvement in timeli-
ness of outbreak detection over more traditional public
health methods, such as telephone calls from concerned
clinicians, deﬁnes the usefulness of a surveillance system
for rapid outbreak detection.
Early outbreak detection has always been of interest
to public health. Most outbreaks are recognized from
accumulated case reports or by alert clinicians [3], and
surveillance systems have traditionally enhanced detec-
tion by identifying outbreaks spread across multiple
reporting sites. In contrast, many bioterrorism surveil-
lance systems are designed to detect large outbreaks in
single communities before a clinician can diagnose the
100 D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113index case and then report to public health. Researchers
and public health practitioners use terms such as ‘‘syn-
dromic’’ and ‘‘pre-diagnostic’’ to identify surveillance
focused on very early detection of outbreaks [4]. The
shift in focus to very early detection places new demands
on systems. Early detection systems must use data col-
lected from individuals prior to the assignment of a
deﬁnitive diagnosis. These data sources, such as emer-
gency department chief complaints and over-the-counter
pharmaceutical sales, are by nature less speciﬁc than
diagnostic data. Surveillance systems that use these
types of data sources require outbreak detection algo-
rithms that can analyze non-speciﬁc signals and use as
much available information as possible to avoid false
positives while improving timeliness.
To advance research on improving timeliness of out-
break detection, the Defense Advanced Research Pro-
ject Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Bio-event
Advanced Leading Indicator Recognition Technology
(BioALIRT) project beginning in October 2001 [5]. This
project brought together researchers from four universi-
ties, two companies, the US military, and an indepen-
dent evaluation contractor, providing a forum for the
interchange and critical consideration of early research
results. Table 1 lists the teams and web addresses where
readers may ﬁnd more information including publica-
tions and software. Project teams focused on two ap-
proaches to improving the timeliness of outbreak
detection: (i) identifying new non-traditional data
sources with early alerting potential; and, (ii) developing
and evaluating outbreak detection algorithms for sur-
veillance data. Another important research focus not
mentioned in this paper was the development of meth-
ods for ensuring privacy in surveillance. The purpose
of this paper is to synthesize some major themes in re-
search on detection algorithms conducted through the
BioALIRT project. Papers to describe the entire project
in greater detail, and to summarize research on surveil-Table 1
BioALIRT project teams and web sites that provide details on the
research groups and access to available software
Team Web site
Carnegie Mellon University,
Computer Science, Auton Lab
www.autonlab.org
General Dynamics,
Advanced Information Systems
www.gd-ais.com
IBM Watson Research www.watson.ibm.com
Johns Hopkins University,
Applied Physics Lab
www.jhuapl.edu
Johns Hopkins University,
School of Public Health
www.jhsph.edu
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies www.potomacinstitute.org
Stanford University,
Stanford Medical Informatics
www.smi.stanford.edu
University of Pittsburgh,
RODS Laboratory
www.health.pitt.edu/rods
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research www.wrair.army.millance data sources conducted within the project, are un-
der development. In this paper, we do not present
detection algorithms in detail, but rather we convey
our research ﬁndings subdivided by the types of infor-
mation available for surveillance. We begin by present-
ing a practical classiﬁcation for detection algorithms
that guided much of our work. Then we synthesize our
research on detection algorithms according to our prac-
tical classiﬁcation and discuss approaches to evaluating
detection algorithms. Finally, we close by considering
our progress towards addressing the challenges in detec-
tion algorithm research and by identifying promising
areas for future research.2. Framing the problem
Surveillance is the process of systematic data collec-
tion, ongoing analysis and interpretation, and dissemi-
nation of results to those who need to know [6].
Surveillance analysis should provide information to
guide public health decision-making, and the improve-
ment in decision-making and public health outcomes
determines the ultimate worth of improved detection
performance. To allow careful consideration of analysis
methods though, we limit our focus in this paper to
detection algorithms, which were one aspect of the
BioALIRT program. We do not examine the broader
question of how these detection algorithms inﬂuence
public health decision-making. In addition, although
problems encountered in syndromic surveillance moti-
vate our work, we do not address the larger question
of the utility of syndromic surveillance in general. In-
deed, the majority of ﬁndings presented are applicable
to outbreak detection in other types of surveillance.
Discussions and reviews of outbreak detection algo-
rithms tend to consider detection algorithms in terms
of their historical foundations such as statistical process
control [7], change-point detection [8] or spatial statistics
[9]. This approach facilitates a review as algorithms ﬁt
neatly into these categories, but this perspective does
not address the practical application of these algorithms.
We suggest an approach to considering outbreak detec-
tion algorithms that instead considers the types of infor-
mation encountered in surveillance. The intent is to
provide a classiﬁcation of algorithms based on their
functional characteristics that is meaningful to surveil-
lance practitioners and researchers.
Surveillance analysts and researchers conduct many
analyses under the broad heading of outbreak detection.
In practice, we have found that a few information con-
texts encompass most surveillance environments (Table
2). The number of data sources, the availability of
covariate data, and the availability of spatial informa-
tion deﬁne these contexts. Traditionally, most surveil-
lance analysis has used only a single data source with
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cell in Table 2). One might encounter data of this type
when analyzing counts of emergency department (ED)
visits to a single hospital, or more typically, case reports
of a reportable condition [10]. When spatial information
is available by case, we make a distinction between the
situation where there are only a few geographic loca-
tions and the one where there are many geographic loca-
tions. One might encounter data from a few locations
when analyzing counts of ED visits from a small number
of hospitals, and data from many spatial locations when
analyzing ED visits by patient home ZIP code. Analysis
of multiple data sources generally requires additional
considerations, most notably an approach to combining
the data sources. In the simplest case, one might encoun-
ter multiple data sources when analyzing aggregate
counts from diﬀerent data streams for the same institu-
tion or geographic region (for example, ED visit counts
and pharmaceutical prescription counts for the same
hospital). The addition of spatial information and other
covariates results in more complex analytic contexts.
Outbreak detection in public health surveillance has
traditionally used single time-series due to limitations
of data and algorithms. Contexts represented by the
cells in Table 2 to the right and down from this tradi-
tional context contain progressively more information.
Enhanced public health information systems are begin-
ning to provide the data necessary for surveillance in
these more information-intensive contexts [11–13]. A
major aim of the algorithm research in the BioALIRT
project is to expand the knowledge of outbreak detec-
tion algorithms that can use large volumes of informa-
tion eﬀectively. An underlying hypothesis of this
research is that algorithms that use the additional infor-
mation found in spatial location, other covariates, and
multiple data sources can detect outbreaks more rapidly
than algorithms that do not use this additional
information.3. Research synthesis
3.1. Detection algorithms by surveillance analysis context
Surveillance to detect outbreaks entails analyzing ob-
served surveillance data prospectively to detect a mean-
ingful change from the expected range of data values.
Due to its prospective nature, with new data arriving
continuously or at regular intervals, analysis for out-
break detection diﬀers from the retrospective analyses
performed in many public health and epidemiological
settings, where all the data are available at the outset
of the analysis. Surveillance analysis also faces
challenges not encountered in other public health and
epidemiological settings due to the need to model and
forecast expected data values over time and space.
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102 D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113Another important component of analysis for outbreaks
is the approach used to determine what constitutes a
meaningful change from expected values. Assessing the
performance of detection algorithms is another impor-
tant consideration and there are many metrics for mea-
suring the detection performance of an algorithm, some
of which we discuss below. Regardless of the metric
used, the goal of outbreak detection is to identify out-
breaks rapidly with few false alarms.
The algorithm research conducted through the pro-
ject included evaluation of existing algorithms applied
in realistic surveillance settings, the extension of existing
algorithms, and the development of new algorithms.
Existing algorithms for prospective outbreak detection
were the foundation for much of our work. We do not
attempt to review the literature on outbreak detection
algorithms exhaustively. Instead, we refer interested
readers to recent reviews of this topic [7–9] and endeavor
here to make our description of algorithms accessible to
readers without extensive experience in this area. We di-
vide our synthesis of algorithm research into three sec-
tions that contain the contexts discussed earlier. Table
3 shows the algorithms examined by research teams in
each surveillance context.
3.2. Single data source without spatial information
Many researchers have examined the use of statistical
process control (SPC) methods for surveillance analysis
of a single time-series [14,15]. These methods were de-
signed to monitor the number of defective products in
a manufacturing process, and to identify an increase
that might imply the onset of a problem in the manufac-
turing process. Given the vast SPC literature, research
on SPC methods within the project tended to focus on
the practical issues of applying and extending existing
algorithms for outbreak detection rather than on the
development of new algorithms.
Project researchers found the exponentially weighted
moving average (EWMA) to be a simple and robust
SPC method for surveillance of sparse data [16]. We
noted that theoretically deﬁned alerting thresholds for
the EWMA and other SPC methods [17] tend to pro-
duce false alarm rates in ranges that are not useful for
public health practice, possibly because public health
surveillance data tend to violate assumptions of SPC
methods as we discuss below. Instead, we found alert
thresholds empirically derived from historical algorithm
output to be more robust. In other words, thresholds
derived assuming Gaussian residuals give frequently
suboptimal and occasionally poor performance for rea-
sons that include statistical problems such as non-sta-
tionarity and correlation, as well as data quality issues
such as late and missing reports. Adaptive, empirically
derived thresholds do not solve all these problems, but
they do help.
D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113 103It is possible to enhance the sensitivity of an EWMA
and other SPC methods to a gradually increasing signal
by incorporating a short guard band (e.g., 2 days) to
avoid contamination of the baseline with an outbreak
signal [18]. Most anomaly-detection methods operate
by comparing observed data values to expected ones de-
rived from a baseline interval. If there is no gap between
the baseline and test intervals, then the start of a signal
can upwardly bias the expectation calculated from the
baseline and cause the algorithm to fail to ﬂag the
remainder of the signal. Introducing a lag, or guard
band, between the baseline interval and the recent inter-
val helps to prevent the loss of sensitivity that may result
from a gradually increasing outbreak contaminating the
baseline in this way. While intuitively obvious, it is also
worth noting that the depth of memory parameter in the
EWMA method (and analogous parameters in other
methods) aﬀects performance for diﬀerent types of out-
break signals. For example, the traditional choice of a
value of around 0.3 for the memory parameter [16] re-
sults in good performance for detection of a lognormal
epidemic curve with a short median incubation period
(e.g., 2 days). However, a memory parameter closer to
1.0 (i.e., replacement of EWMA with a Shewhart chart)
is preferable for the detection of single-day spikes or
more scattered signals since little data smoothing then
occurs.
Single time-series that contain a greater frequency of
events tend to exhibit substantial temporal structure
such as a day-of-week cycle. We found that, in this situ-
ation, pre-processing before application of a SPC meth-
od can improve detection performance. An approach
used by many research teams was to predict the daily
count using a linear or Poisson regression model, and
then to apply a SPC method to the regression residuals.
For example, to predict sales of over-the-counter (OTC)
pharmaceuticals, one research team used a Poisson
model with variables for trend, day of the week, season-
ality, and temperature, plus an autoregressive term.
They then used the EWMA method to detect changes
in the regression residuals. The Poisson model does
not require constant variance and may be more robust
than other linear models for forecasting in this setting
[19]. Another research team used an adaptive Kalman
ﬁlter [20] to forecast expected values for each day fol-
lowed by the application of standard diagnostic meth-
ods to the forecast residuals. Initial results suggest that
this approach may work well for non-stationary data,
but further research is required. Another pre-processing
approach used by one research team was to perform a
wavelet analysis of the time series [21]. Researchers used
the wavelet model to forecast values for each day and to
produce residuals which they analyzed for deviations
from expectation.
Methods for monitoring single time-series cannot
easily exploit additional information available fromcovariates in individual records. Researchers in this pro-
ject developed two approaches for exploiting covariate
information. The Biosurveillance using a change-point
detector (BCD) method and the whats strange about re-
cent events? (WSARE) method [22,23] were both devel-
oped for surveillance of a single data source with
covariate information. The BCD method is an extension
of a standard change-point surveillance method, the
likelihood test [24], that accommodates covariate infor-
mation by representing the distribution of covariate val-
ues as a Bayesian network. The algorithm then uses the
network to infer the probabilities of the recently ob-
served data under assumptions that an outbreak has
and has not occurred. A likelihood ratio is then calcu-
lated from these two probabilities, and a p-value is
empirically derived by using the empirical Monte Carlo
strategy which is commonly adopted to determine statis-
tical signiﬁcance when the sampling distribution is
intractable [25]. The BCD method performed well in a
recent blinded algorithm evaluation using real data [26].
The WSARE method searches for irregularities in
covariate values using rules [22,23]. An example of a rule
is ‘‘Gender = Male AND Home Location = NW.’’ This
rule indicates that WSARE is determining whether the
number of recent cases involving male patients in the
northwest geographic area is unusually high. Each
day, WSARE considers all possible rules involving sin-
gle or pairs of covariates and selects the most statisti-
cally signiﬁcant rule for the current time period using
a randomization test to guard against multiple-hypothe-
sis testing errors. To account for trends in the baseline
data such as day-of-week and seasonal eﬀects, WSARE
uses a Bayesian network to produce the baseline distri-
bution by taking the joint distributions of the data
and conditioning on attributes that are responsible for
the trends. In simulations designed by its authors,
WSARE produced better detection times and slightly
higher false-positive rates than algorithms that do not
examine covariate information [22].
In general, we found that algorithms used for surveil-
lance analysis in other domains, such as SPC algorithms
intended for use in a manufacturing, require adaptation
for use in public health surveillance, due mainly to the
characteristics of surveillance data. Healthcare adminis-
tration data in particular contain regular (e.g., day-
of-week) and irregular (e.g., seasons and holidays) tem-
poral patterns in addition to unexplained irregular
variation (Fig. 1). In some situations it is possible to
model many of these features using regression methods,
but regression modeling generally requires considerable
baseline data and we found that models developed for
one data set or geographic location did not easily trans-
fer to other data sets or locations. SPC methods are
attractive due to their simplicity, and the true beneﬁt
of more complex regression-based methods over simpler
SPC methods is unknown in real settings. Another
Fig. 1. Example of univariate time-series data encountered in public health surveillance. These data are aggregate daily counts of ambulatory clinic
visits for respiratory conditions in a metropolitan area. The top plot illustrates the seasonal and long-term variation in the data. The bottom plot
shows the same data at a higher temporal resolution to illustrate the day-of-week and holiday eﬀects.
104 D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113important observation from our work with single time-
series surveillance is that diﬀerent algorithms are suited
to detecting diﬀerent types of outbreak signals. This
observation likely extends to other surveillance contexts
and may seem self-evident, but the issue of matching
algorithms to types of outbreak signals has received lit-
tle explicit consideration in the public health surveillance
literature. For example, a signal resulting from a bioter-
rorism attack may diﬀer considerably from a signal due
to an inﬂuenza epidemic because of the spatial distribu-
tion of victims, the temporal distribution of primary
cases, and other scenario-dependent features. A ﬁnal
observation is that data quality inﬂuences the perfor-
mance of an outbreak detection algorithm. Inconsistent
reporting of cases may strongly impact algorithm per-
formance, and we found that using rates instead of
counts can help to address this problem. When reliable
denominator data are not available, which is often the
case in syndromic surveillance, we found it helpful to
use ratios. These included the ratio of syndromic counts
to all counts and the ratio of syndromic counts to daily
counts of reporting providers. The ratio of syndrome
counts to reporting providers was particularly eﬀective
in reducing the late reporting problem, when the neces-
sary data were available.3.3. Single data source with spatial information
In contrast to surveillance analysis of a single time-se-
ries, there is not an extensive body of literature describ-
ing algorithms suitable for prospective analysis of a
single data source with spatial information [9]. Research
teams therefore devoted a considerable amount of eﬀort
to examining the application of existing methods in this
context and to developing new methods. Diﬀerent ap-
proaches exist for using spatial information in surveil-
lance analysis. Some approaches use spatial location as
a categorical variable similar to any other covariate such
as age. More detailed approaches account for unique
characteristics of spatial information such as topology
and geometry [27]. In general, methods for cluster detec-
tion tend to consider topology explicitly through adja-
cency or distance between regions. Geometry, or the
expected shape of an outbreak, is less frequently a prime
consideration and many methods make simplifying
assumptions about geometry to improve analytic
tractability.
A straightforward approach to using spatial informa-
tion is to apply a separate SPC method within each spa-
tial region. For example, if daily counts of emergency
department visits are available for 20 ZIP codes, this
D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113 105approach would entail following the results of 20 SPC
methods, one for each ZIP code. If temporal structure
is present within the time-series in spatial regions then
pre-processing of counts within each region before
application of an SPC method may improve perfor-
mance. In this approach, critical thresholds for declaring
an outbreak must account for the multiple tests per-
formed to avoid excessive false alerts. When analytical
corrections for the multiple comparisons are not easily
determined, decision thresholds are usually set with
Monte Carlo simulation using historical data. This ap-
proach does not consider the unique characteristics of
spatial information, and we examined variations on this
approach that incorporate information on the topology
of regions. For example, we calculated smoothed region
forecasts by modeling each region forecast as a function
of values in neighboring regions. We also aggregated
connected spatial regions and then applied SPC methods
to the smaller number of aggregate regions. Raubertas
[28] was one of the ﬁrst researchers to use neighboring
regions in a similar approach to forecast values in pro-
spective surveillance analysis. Some research teams
noted that this type of smoothing can decrease sensitiv-
ity for localized signals and that there is no data-sensi-
tive, generalizable way to form neighborhood
groupings. In an attempt to avoid the arbitrary aspect
of neighborhood deﬁnition, one research team examined
the use of unsupervised clustering methods including
k-means and hierarchical clustering to aggregate
connected regions [29]. Initial results suggest that such
clustering can improve detection performance for out-
breaks spread across a small number of spatial regions.
When many spatial regions are under surveillance,
the application of a separate SPC method for each re-
gion can become unwieldy. Also, aggregating regions
prior to analysis lose information. We examined two
general approaches to detecting outbreaks in data from
large numbers of spatial regions [30]. One approach is to
detect increased global clustering or the general propen-
sity for connected regions to exhibit similarly increased
rates of health-related events. The other approach is to
detect focused clusters of regions with increased rates
of events, or the propensity for increased rates of events
to occur around a single location. To detect increased
global clustering we found it useful to apply a method
along the lines of those described by Rogerson [31,32]
and Jarpe [33]. This approach entails applying a global
spatial clustering algorithm to the surveillance data at
each time point and following changes in the spatial
clustering statistic over time using a SPC or change-
point detection method. In essence, this reduces a spatial
surveillance problem to a univariate time-series surveil-
lance problem. We examined Tangos method for global
clustering followed by a cumulative sum [31] in a num-
ber of settings. Important modiﬁcations to this ap-
proach for practical use included the calculation ofexpected values from historical observations as opposed
to population estimates, and modiﬁcation to the statistic
to enable consideration of multiple counts in a temporal
interval as opposed to continuous updating following
the arrival of each case. One drawback of global cluster
detection approaches is that they identify the existence
of clustering but do not identify the location of cluster-
ing [34]. In addition, many global clustering algorithms
require a priori speciﬁcation of a parameter correspond-
ing to the scale of the clustering, although Tango [35] de-
scribes a method for searching over all possible
clustering scales.
To detect focused clusters in data from a large num-
ber of spatial regions, we examined the space–time scan
statistic [36,37]. This method identiﬁes the location of
the most anomalous cluster relative to the expected spa-
tial case distribution. It does not require a priori speciﬁ-
cation of likely cluster locations or cluster size. As with
the global cluster detection methods, an important issue
encountered when using the space–time scan statistic for
prospective surveillance is the need for stable, updated
daily estimates of the expected spatial distribution of
counts in order to avoid ﬁnding spurious clusters,
although an approach based purely on permutation of
observed values may avoid this [38]. We found test per-
formance was acceptable when using recent data as a
baseline with a temporal guard band to avoid bias to-
wards the null hypothesis. As discussed earlier, the
guard band separates the baseline data used to compute
expected values from the current data under examina-
tion. This prevents an outbreak signal from aﬀecting
both the baseline and recent data, and thus reducing
algorithm sensitivity. An attractive feature of the
space–time scan statistic is that it can incorporate covar-
iate information contained in individual records. This
enhancement requires the calculation of expected values
within each region for each combination of strata (e.g.,
age group, gender). The BCD and WSARE methods de-
scribed in the previous section also incorporate covari-
ate and spatial information. These algorithms,
however, treat spatial location as a categorical variable,
and this does not recognize the full value of spatial
information. Another method developed through the
BioALIRT project is the Bayesian Aerosol Release
Detector (BARD), which aims to detect patterns in the
data consistent with the aerosol release of a disease
agent [39]. The BARD method uses a Gaussian model
of agent dispersion, recent meteorological data, and
Bayesian models of disease symptoms and the data un-
der normal conditions to estimate the probability that
recently observed surveillance data indicate an aerosol
release of a disease agent into the community.
In general, available detection algorithms use spatial
information diﬀerently. The simplest approach is to
treat spatial location as categorical variable. This ap-
proach does not harness the full potential of spatial
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allows any algorithm capable of considering categorical
covariates to incorporate spatial information. Exploit-
ing topology or connectedness requires making some
assumptions about the inﬂuence of inter-region distance
on disease clustering under normal and abnormal condi-
tions. There is no well-deﬁned set of methods for mod-
eling space–time variation in surveillance data under
normal conditions. We relied upon a historical baseline
in many cases, but there is a need for research on this
topic. Use of a space–time scan statistic minimizes the
assumptions about the topology of clustering under out-
break conditions, but imposes assumptions about the
geometry of disease patterns. For example, the space–
time scan statistic assumes a contiguous cluster in the
form of a circle or cylinder. While there is some work
to generalize scan statistics to other shapes [40,41], it is
important to note that in most situations it is computa-
tionally intractable to search over all possible space–
time shapes to detect outbreaks. Ideally, an analyst
would use epidemiological knowledge to limit the search
to space–time shapes of practical interest, and further
research is required to deﬁne these shapes. The BARD
method is an example of how an algorithm can use
knowledge about disease-agent exposure to limit the
search to a speciﬁc geometric shape, namely an ellipsoid
corresponding to a Gaussian plume. As with the need to
understand the relationship between temporal signals
and types of outbreaks, there is also a need to under-
stand the relationship between space–time signals and
types of outbreaks.
Space–time analytic methods are attractive for out-
break detection because they may help to direct atten-
tion to speciﬁc regions of interest, but their eﬀective
use faces some challenges. For example, application of
space–time analytic methods requires calculating a sta-
ble estimate of the spatial distribution, and updating
the distribution as it changes over time. Also, the spatial
error inherent in relying on a single location for each re-
cord, usually home address, may limit the relationship
between measured spatial location and true spatial dis-
ease patterns. For example, spatial analysis by home ad-
dress may oﬀer little beneﬁt over purely temporal
analysis if exposure occurs in the middle of a workday
when few people are at home. Misspeciﬁcation of expo-
sure location is one of many potential sources of error in
an analysis, but understanding the contribution of spa-
tial information to outbreak detection in realistic sur-
veillance settings is an important topic for future
research.
3.4. Multiple data sources with and without spatial
information
Public health agencies have traditionally not had
access to multiple data sources suitable for surveillanceof a single outcome. By ‘‘Multiple data sources’’ we
mean separately collected data sources (e.g., clinical vis-
its and pharmaceutical prescriptions) relevant to a single
outcome (e.g., inﬂuenza cases), and this is distinct from
a single data source with covariate information (Table
2). Analysis of multiple surveillance data sources is
becoming feasible as surveillance data are increasingly
available electronically, but the research literature on
the analysis of multiple surveillance data sources is lim-
ited. We examined two approaches to the analysis of
multiple data sources. One approach is to compute algo-
rithm outputs for each data source separately with uni-
variate methods, and then to combine the separate
results using a second method. The other approach is
to apply a multivariate algorithm to data from all
sources simultaneously.
A straightforward approach to combining results
from separate univariate analyses of diﬀerent data
sources is to pool the p-values from the separate anal-
yses using a ‘‘consensus’’ method such as the one de-
ﬁned by Edgington [42]. This approach assumes that
the data sources are independent, and in practice,
false-positive detections tend to increase when more
correlated series are pooled in this manner. One ap-
proach to pooling p-values that accounts for correla-
tion among data sources is a Bayesian network [43].
Initial results with this approach are encouraging and
this is a promising area for future research. An ap-
proach to conducting simultaneous analysis of multiple
data sources is to use multivariate SPC (MSPC) meth-
ods that explicitly account for the covariance among
data sources. We examined some MSPC methods for
this purpose but found them overly sensitive to changes
in the covariance structure, such as a fall-oﬀ in counts
from a single data source, which are not of interest in a
surveillance context. More speciﬁcally, in a blinded
comparison of detection algorithms, we found that
MSPC methods tended to have greater sensitivity than
univariate methods, but the MSPC methods also pro-
duced more false alarms, which weakened their overall
performance [26]. A modiﬁed version of the Hotellings
T2 statistic following Ye et al. [44] avoided this over-
sensitivity to some extent, and future research on direc-
tional adaptations of the newer methods seems
warranted. In situations where many related data
sources were available (e.g., sales data for dozens of
classes of over-the-counter pharmaceuticals) we ex-
plored approaches to reducing the number of data
sources. Reduction was accomplished through unsuper-
vised clustering algorithms, expert opinion, or a combi-
nation of the two. In general, data reduction improved
detection performance when highly correlated data
sources could be combined. We did not rigorously
evaluate the impact on detection performance of
diﬀerent approaches to data reduction, pre-processing,
or the potential eﬀects on real-time decision-making
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tant areas for future investigation. When covariates and
spatial information were present, we examined the use of
a multivariate space–time scan statistic [45]. This method
searches for signiﬁcant clusters with a stratiﬁed scan sta-
tistic deﬁned by the addition of log likelihoods computed
for the separate data types. Monte Carlo simulation
studies demonstrate that this statistic detects anomalous
counts across data sources while retaining sensitivity to
spatial anomalies in individual data sources [45]. An-
other option in this context is to apply an algorithm such
as WSARE, although we did not explicitly examine this
over the course of the project.
Heuristically, combing all available information in a
multivariate algorithm should give better results than
univariate methods applied to data from each source
followed by a hypothesis test based on separate outputs.
In practice though, univariate surveillance analysis is
easier to implement and there are a number of issues
that make simultaneous multivariate analysis diﬃcult
in practice. The central problem is similar to that faced
when using spatial information for surveillance. Deﬁni-
tion of meaningful deviations in a multivariate sense re-
quires not only careful modeling of data under the null
hypothesis, but also explicit speciﬁcation of data charac-
teristics under alternative hypotheses. In univariate and
spatial analyses, most analysts implicitly rely on the
‘‘omnibus’’ alternative hypothesis, that something is
not normal. With spatial and multivariate data though,
more speciﬁc alternative hypotheses are required to
guard against detection of statistically signiﬁcant
changes from baseline that are not of epidemiological
importance. Speciﬁcation of alternative hypotheses re-
quires knowledge of outbreak patterns, though, and this
knowledge is not generally available. For example, one
research team has experience using the Kalman ﬁlter
formalism to analyze multiple data sources such as ra-
dar returns in an attempt to detect patterns attributable
to distant aircraft or ballistic missiles [20]. This analytic
approach is analogous to following multiple health-re-
lated data source in order to detect patterns attributable
to epidemics. We were not able to apply the Kalman ﬁl-
ter formalism to multiple data source surveillance
though, because there is insuﬃcient knowledge of the
dynamic patterns in surveillance data attributable to dis-
ease outbreaks. Understanding outbreak patterns in
high-dimension data and translating these patterns into
speciﬁc outbreak detection hypotheses is an important
area of future research.
3.5. The evaluation of outbreak detection algorithms
The research teams in the BioALIRT project invested
considerable eﬀort in the evaluation of outbreak detec-
tion algorithms. These eﬀorts included development of
test data, work with evaluation metrics, and participa-tion in blinded algorithm evaluation studies. Siegrist de-
scribes in detail the methods for the most recent blinded
evaluation [26]. Brieﬂy, the blinded evaluation involved
presenting each algorithm development team with test
data sets containing unlabelled outbreaks. Each team
prospectively applied their algorithms to the test data
and declared the location of suspected outbreaks before
the true locations of outbreaks were released to allow
evaluation of detection performance. In this section,
we summarize our experience with test data and evalua-
tion metrics.
3.6. Test data
We deﬁned test data as data containing known out-
break signals used to deﬁne the performance character-
istics of algorithms. The role played by test data in
algorithm research is a crucial one. The validity of con-
clusions regarding algorithm performance rests upon the
validity of the test data used to deﬁne performance.
Ideal test data contain a suﬃcient number of outbreak
and non-outbreak periods for precise calculation of sen-
sitivity, speciﬁcity, and timeliness, and a variation in
outbreak signal that covers some range of plausible out-
break type and size. The signal for each outbreak should
be clearly deﬁned in terms of onset, completion, and
possibly the nominal and desired alert times or points
of successful detection. Test data can be described
as: (i) wholly authentic; (ii) wholly simulated; or, (iii)
simulated outbreaks superimposed onto authentic data
(Table 4).
Wholly authentic data are appealing due to their face
validity. They allow evaluation of the true eﬀectiveness
of detection algorithms with real data. Algorithms must
address the challenges of real surveillance data and the
outbreak signals reﬂect true disease activity in the pop-
ulation. The project used wholly authentic test data
for a blinded algorithm evaluation in 2003 [26]. Despite
the intuitive appeal of this approach there are practical
problems. A central problem is the deﬁnition of what
constitutes an outbreak. In general, it is possible to de-
rive outbreaks directly from the data alone or to use
external information to deﬁne outbreaks. One approach
to identifying outbreaks from the data alone is for a
committee of experts to identify changes in the data that
would warrant epidemiological investigation [26]. This is
a time-consuming procedure whose reliability is un-
known. An algorithm to nominate potential outbreaks
for review by an expert committee can semi-automate
the process, but the selection of the nominating algo-
rithm may bias the evaluation. In principle, it is also
possible to automate this process fully by using an algo-
rithm that retrospectively examines data for outbreaks.
This approach might be useful if there are large volumes
of data to examine and there is a suﬃciently large train-
ing set of known outbreaks to guide the retrospective
Table 4
Advantages and disadvantages to diﬀerent methods for generating test sets for evaluation of outbreak detection algorithms
Type of test set Advantages Disadvantages
Wholly authentic Face validity; authentic background
and outbreak signal
Resources required to deﬁne outbreaks; validity and
reliability of outbreak identiﬁcation may be poor
and diﬃcult to assess; limited number and variety
of outbreaks
Wholly simulated Exact speciﬁcation of outbreak signal;
large number of test sets possible;
can be simple to develop; enables
sensitivity analyses
Complexity of simulating background and
outbreak signal; validity may be poor and diﬃcult
to assess; can require many parameter values
Simulated outbreaks superimposed
onto authentic data
Greater face validity than wholly simulated
test sets; exact speciﬁcation of outbreak signal;
large number of test sets possible;
enables sensitivity analyses
Complexity of simulating outbreak signal;
validity may be poor and diﬃcult to assess;
can require many parameter values
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mation to deﬁne outbreaks include consulting other sur-
veillance systems in the same region or contacting public
health agencies. Regardless of the approach taken to
identifying outbreaks, the number and variety of exist-
ing outbreaks limit authentic test data. In some cases,
such as for outbreaks resulting from bioterrorism, insuf-
ﬁcient data exist to calculate precise estimates of detec-
tion performance. In cases where suﬃcient data do
exist, such as for inﬂuenza outbreaks, the resources re-
quired to describe outbreaks adequately for use in an
evaluation study will limit the number and variety of
outbreaks available for a study. A ﬁnal and important
limitation of using wholly authentic data is that privacy
concerns often limit the ability of multiple research
groups to share test data for comparative evaluation
of algorithms developed by diﬀerent groups.
Wholly simulated test data are appealing for algo-
rithm evaluation because they allow exact speciﬁcation
of the outbreak signal, perfect knowledge of the out-
break onset, and evaluators can create large amounts
of test data. The BioALIRT project used wholly simu-
lated test data for a blinded algorithm evaluation in
2002 and a number of research teams used this approach
during algorithm development. Although wholly simu-
lated data allow statistical precision in algorithm re-
search, validation of both the background and the
outbreak signal makes this approach problematic. This
problem is non-trivial even in the single time-series con-
text, and increasing the complexity of a simulation mod-
el to generate spatial and other covariate information
magniﬁes the importance of this issue. To allow for
meaningful evaluation of diverse algorithms, both nor-
mal and outbreak data must be simulated in a manner
that ensures suﬃcient complexity and validity in terms
of factors such as spatial patterns, temporal patterns,
and joint distributions of variables. As a simulation
model grows to meet these requirements, the number
of parameters increases, the ability to verify the model
becomes diﬃcult, and ultimately it becomes more diﬃ-
cult to ensure the validity of the simulated data.Superimposition of simulated outbreaks onto authen-
tic data improves on purely simulated data by eliminat-
ing background modeling questions. The project did not
use this approach in a blinded algorithm evaluation, but
it was explored and research continues on this topic [46].
The main beneﬁt of the superimposed or injected out-
break approach is that the normal or baseline data need
not be simulated. However, in addition to the need for a
valid outbreak signal, algorithms must not be able to
identify the simulated outbreak signal too easily in the
background data. As a trivial example, a simulated sig-
nal superimposed on physician visit data may be easily
detected if the signal does not account for the day-of-
week eﬀect in health care utilization. Suﬃciently accu-
rate modeling of the outbreak eﬀects on the data is an
important concern for this approach as it is for wholly
simulated data. However, since early alerting is the pri-
mary purpose of these algorithms, one may limit the
modeling complexity by bounding the focus of the sim-
ulation to the initial part of an outbreak and making
plausible assumptions about individual and health care
provider behavior before public and media reaction fur-
ther skew the data [46].
In general, the approach to generating test sets
should be tailored to the evaluation, and all the ap-
proaches outlined above play an important role in re-
search on outbreak detection algorithms (Table 4).
Wholly simulated test data are likely to be most useful
for evaluation of algorithms under development and
for comparative evaluation of algorithms with rela-
tively simple data requirements (e.g., algorithms that
operate on a single time-series). Wholly authentic test
data are likely to be most useful when the data contain
a suﬃcient quantity and variety of outbreaks of the
type the algorithms are designed to detect, and when
resources exist to identify outbreaks in the data. Simu-
lated outbreaks superimposed onto authentic data are
likely to be most useful when there is a need to evalu-
ate algorithms and surveillance systems rigorously un-
der a range of assumptions in a realistic setting.
Regardless of the approach used to generate test data,
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context in which surveillance systems operate. In other
words, algorithm evaluations help one to understand
the performance of algorithms for ﬁnding anomalies,
but cannot characterize the inﬂuence of algorithm per-
formance on public health decision-making. Finally, it
is worth noting that outbreak signals of diﬀerent ﬁdel-
ity and complexity are needed to evaluate diﬀerent
algorithms. In a comparative algorithm evaluation, this
implies that the most complex algorithm dictates the
required ﬁdelity and complexity of the outbreak signal.
For example, evaluation of a time-series algorithm re-
quires a test data set with a signal that is valid only
in the time domain, whereas evaluation of an algo-
rithm, such as WSARE, that examines the joint distri-
bution of many variables requires a more complex
outbreak signal that is valid in terms of time, space,
and other covariates.
3.7. Evaluation metrics
Sensitivity and speciﬁcity are two commonly used
evaluation metrics for outbreak detection algorithms
(Table 5). When calculated over a range of parameter
settings for an algorithm, the set of sensitivity/speciﬁcity
values can be plotted to determine the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve and the area under the ROC
curve [47]. While these metrics summarize the overall
ability of an algorithm to detect outbreaks, they do
not evaluate the timeliness of detection. Given that a
main motivation of the project is to develop algorithms
for rapid detection, we adopted the activity monitoring
operating characteristic (AMOC) [48]. Fig. 2 shows an
example AMOC curve. An AMOC curve associates aTable 5
Metrics used for evaluation of outbreak detection algorithms
Evaluation metric Description
Sensitivity The probability of alarm given that an outbreak o
Speciﬁcity The probability of no alarm given that an outbre
Predictive value The probability that an alarm is truly an outbrea
ROCa curve The curve deﬁned by plotting sensitivity (or true p
of algorithm parameter settings
Area under ROC curve Summarizes the detection performance of an algo
a random detection scheme
AMOCb curve The curve deﬁned by plotting a summary measure
for a range of algorithm thresholds
FROCc curve The curve deﬁned by plotting the fraction of outb
for a range of algorithm thresholds
ARLd The expected time until the ﬁrst detection (ARL0)
at the initiation of surveillance (ARL1)
PSDe Probability of an alarm before some critical point
a ROC, receiver operating characteristics.
b AMOC, activity monitoring operating characteristics.
c FROC, free response operating characteristics.
d ARL, average run length.
e PSD, probability of successful detection.timeliness score to each false alert rate of interest. For
our score, we used the median time to alarm following
the onset of an outbreak, and we calculated this score
for a few false-positive values chosen to be practical
from the public health perspective. This measure gives
a concise timeliness summary, but it does combine
short- and long-duration outbreaks without discrimina-
tion. We found the use of median timeliness in the set-
ting more robust than mean timeliness, as it is diﬃcult
to account for missed detections when calculating mean
timeliness. One possible approach is to use the duration
of the outbreak, or the interval between the beginning of
the outbreak and likely detection by another means,
such as reporting by concerned clinicians. In contrast,
when using median time it is possible to assign missed
detections an inﬁnite value without unduly inﬂuencing
calculation of timeliness as long as an algorithm detects
more than half of the outbreaks.
A limitation of both the ROC and AMOC curves is
that they do not evaluate the ability of an algorithm
to identify the geographic location of an outbreak.
One approach to evaluating the spatial accuracy of an
algorithm that identiﬁes cluster locations is to use the
free response operating characteristic (FROC) curve
[49]. We explored the use of this evaluation metric [45]
but did not use it in any blinded algorithm evaluations.
There are a number of other evaluation metrics de-
scribed in the literature. Evaluation studies of change-
point detection algorithms tend to employ other metrics
[8] including average run length (ARL), predictive value
(PV) of an alarm, and probability of successful detection
(PSD). We did not routinely employ these evaluation
metrics in our research, but others have found them to
be useful.ccurs
ak does not occur
k
ositive rate) against 1– speciﬁcity (or false-positive rate) for a range
rithm. Values over 0.5 indicate that the algorithm is better than
of time to alarm given an outbreak occurs against false-positive rate
reak locations detected against false-positive detection rate
; the expected time until an alarm when there is an outbreak
in the outbreak given that the outbreak is detected
Fig. 2. Activity monitoring operating characteristics (AMOC) curves for three algorithms.
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Algorithms for outbreak detection can play an
important role in surveillance. We have described a
practical classiﬁcation for outbreak detection algorithms
that is based on the information requirements and func-
tional characteristics of algorithms. We found this
framework useful in our algorithm research and we in-
tend for this classiﬁcation to be accessible to surveillance
practitioners and to demonstrate the practical applica-
tion of algorithms for researchers. Our framework also
provides a foundation for the development of a more
formal classiﬁcation, or ontology, of outbreak detection
algorithms that might facilitate selecting algorithms to
accomplish speciﬁc surveillance tasks [50]. Assessment
and comparison of algorithms require objective evalua-
tion methods. Rigorous evaluations of outbreak detec-
tion performance are rarely reported in the literature,
and the methodology for such evaluation is not well
developed. We noted particular deﬁciencies in methods
for generating realistic test data and in evaluation met-
rics for assessing the timeliness and spatial precision of
outbreak detection algorithms.
In this paper, we have synthesized research on out-
break detection algorithms conducted by the academic
and industry groups in the DARPA BioALIRT project.
Algorithms used for outbreak detection in public health
traditionally operate on low-dimensional data, typically
univariate time-series. We identiﬁed many algorithms
suitable for use in this context. The main shortcomings
of these algorithms were the modiﬁcations required toapply them to real surveillance data, and the lack of
published evaluation of these algorithms in realistic set-
tings. There are few existing algorithms well suited to
outbreak detection in more information-intensive con-
texts. Some approaches exist to exploit spatial informa-
tion (such as using patient residence to ﬁnd signiﬁcant
case clusters), but very few methods prospectively seek
anomalies in the distributions of other covariates.
Researchers in this project developed methods capable
of using covariate information for prospective surveil-
lance and there remains a pressing need for development
of outbreak detection algorithms that can operate in
information-intensive contexts. There is also a need for
rigorous comparative evaluation to determine the prac-
tical beneﬁt of using covariate and spatial information
from multiple data sources in surveillance. Such evalua-
tion will require development of test data for this pur-
pose, and detailed studies in a prospective setting such
as others have conducted for retrospective algorithms
[34].
In synthesizing our research on outbreak detection
algorithms we noted a number of speciﬁc ﬁndings that
relate to the process or practice of analysis for out-
breaks. We found that when analyzing data sources
without spatial information, there are many potentially
applicable methods and the main issues are adapting
these methods to prospective analysis in realistic set-
tings, and selecting the method most appropriate for
each setting. For example, reliable denominator data
are often not available for surveillance data sources.
Algorithms that require denominator data to account
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to operate in this setting. We also found that one must
consider the vagaries of available data sources in select-
ing outbreak detection algorithms. For example, the
amount of historical data available and the frequency
of counts should inﬂuence the selection of a method.
Regression methods require more baseline data than sta-
tistical process control (SPC) methods, and simpler SPC
methods are likely to outperform more complex meth-
ods in settings with a low frequency of data counts.
We also noted some speciﬁc ﬁndings about the pro-
cess of analyzing data sources with spatial information,
and the process of analyzing multiple data sources. A
fundamental consideration in the analysis of a data
source with spatial information is whether, and how,
to use topological information on adjacency or distance
between sub-regions. Any outbreak detection method
suitable for use with covariate information can use spa-
tial information if topology is not considered. Methods
that use topology may be more powerful, but they re-
quire an understanding of the nature of the spatial dis-
tribution, including how it changes over time. In
settings where it is diﬃcult to understand the spatial dis-
tribution, a simpler method that does not use topology
may be preferable. A similar situation exists in the anal-
ysis of multiple data sources; namely whether to use the
full covariance structure between data sources in an
analysis. Simple strategies for combining results from
multiple univariate analyses do not make use of the full
covariance structure, but they may outperform more
complex strategies that simultaneously analyze multiple
data sources, especially if the full covariance structure is
not well understood.
At a more general level, we also identiﬁed challenges
that future research on outbreak detection algorithms
should address. A common problem is to understand
high-dimensional data under normal conditions suﬃ-
ciently to forecast expected values with precision. In
some situations, data exhibit complex patterns under
normal conditions and this complexity may preclude di-
rect application of methods developed in other domains
where normative data behavior is better understood.
Further work is required to deﬁne the principal factors
inﬂuencing normal data behavior and to evaluate fore-
cast models that incorporate these factors, especially in
spatial and multivariate analysis. Another problem is
to understand the data eﬀects of outbreaks suﬃciently
to recognize epidemiologically meaningful deviations
from normal. As the complexity of the data under anal-
ysis grows, for example by incorporating spatial and
other covariate information, there are more epidemio-
logically irrelevant ways to observe anomalous patterns,
and we need to understand how to explain away irrele-
vant patterns in an automated fashion as much as pos-
sible. There is a need to move beyond non-speciﬁc
alternative hypotheses to improve speciﬁcity and pro-vide informative detection results that are meaningful
to public health practitioners. In addition to facilitating
outbreak detection, improved knowledge of the data ef-
fects of outbreaks should also lead to an improved
understanding of the etiology and management of
outbreaks.
Our research project considered outbreak detection
using a range of data types, but we were not able to con-
sider all possible surveillance settings. For example, we
tended to limit our research on spatial and space–time
methods to approaches suitable for analyzing count
data collected from spatial regions. As a result we did
not consider many of the spatial analysis methods suited
to spatial point patterns, although some of the methods
we used are applicable to point patterns as well as re-
gions. This limitation was a function of the available
surveillance data, which for privacy reasons are usually
aggregated to spatial regions such as ZIP codes or cen-
sus regions.
The goal of this paper is to synthesize our research on
outbreak detection algorithms. To accomplish this, we
have had to limit detail and scope. For example, we have
omitted many details about individual methods in order
to allow consideration of the broader themes that allow
a synthesis of research across diﬀerent project teams. We
have also limited our scope to the detection of devia-
tions from expected in surveillance data, and we have
not discussed issues such as adjustment of data to ac-
count for reporting delay. In a larger sense, we have also
limited our scope by not considering the interplay be-
tween detection of deviations in surveillance data and
public health decision-making. While the important
areas of alert follow-up and consequence management
are beyond this scope, outcomes such as intervention
decisions and the costs, morbidity and mortality attrib-
utable to an outbreak, are how the systems that employ
these algorithms must ultimately be measured.5. Conclusions
The research conducted for this project has examined
how algorithms can use large volumes of electronically
available data to improve the timeliness of outbreak
detection. An underlying hypothesis of this research is
that algorithms that use the additional information
found in covariates, spatial location, and multiple data
sources can detect outbreaks more rapidly than algo-
rithms that do not use this additional information.
Our results tend to support this hypothesis, and we
can identify at least two reasons why we are not able
to oﬀer stronger support. First, incorporating spatial
and covariate information into a prospective analysis
for a disease outbreak raises a number of methodologi-
cal challenges. Forecasting expected values and
identifying epidemiologically signiﬁcant changes from
112 D.L. Buckeridge et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 38 (2005) 99–113expectation in high-dimensional data are two challenges
we identiﬁed. Second, it is diﬃcult to demonstrate con-
vincingly the performance of spatial and multivariate
algorithms in realistic settings. There are few authentic
data sets with known outbreaks available to evaluate
these algorithms, and generation of spatial and multi-
variate test data sets through simulation is a diﬃcult
problem. Future research on detection algorithms and
methods for evaluating outbreak detection must address
these challenges.
We have tried to lay the foundation for research that
will describe whether, and how, surveillance for rapid
outbreak detection should move from analyzing a single
time-series to analyzing covariate and spatial informa-
tion collected from multiple data sources. Our research
results provide initial support for such a transition.
The results reported in the paper address the focused
problem of anomaly detection in surveillance data.
The larger problem of how these results can improve
public health decision-making is an area that requires
future research.Acknowledgments
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